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Note
Genetically Modified Food Fight: The FDA
Should Step Up to the Regulatory Plate so States
Do Not Cross the Constitutional Line
Morgan Anderson Helme∗
We know how many calories are in it. We know if it contains gluten, and its percentage of sodium out of an ideal daily
1
diet. Fat-free, sugar-free, may contain peanuts, all natural,
and an excellent source of fiber—the label spells it all out for
2
concerned consumers. But despite this apparent glutton of in3
formation about the food we eat, the use of genetically modi4
fied ingredients remains a guessing game in the grocery aisle.
Farms are rapidly expanding use of genetically engineered
5
crops, which, in turn, increases their presence in food. In 1997,
6
17% of U.S. soybean acreage was genetically modified. Today,
∗ J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
Chapman University. Thank you to Professor Ralph Hall for his insight and
guidance. Special thanks to Nathan Ebnet and the editors and staff of Minnesota Law Review for their many contributions to this Note. Unending thanks
go out to my family and friends for their love, support, and comic relief
throughout the harrowing journey of law school. Above all, thank you to my
parents, Rhonda Anderson and Brian Helme, for inspiring and encouraging
me along every step in life. Copyright © 2013 by Morgan Anderson Helme.
1. See Daniel A. Kracov & Joshua M. Glasser, The Regulation of Foods
and Food Additives, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW
REGULATION 257, 284 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 4th ed. 2012).
2. See id. at 257, 282, 318.
3. See id. at 278.
4. See Kammi L. Rencher, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights: A Piece
of Cake or Pie in the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418, 429 (2012).
5. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Birth of Synthetic Biology and the Genetic
Mode of Production, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: INTERIM POLICIES,
UNCERTAIN LEGISLATION 3, 10–11 (Iain E.P. Taylor ed., 2007) (describing the
trajectory of plant modification from classical breeding to modern genetic engineering).
6. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically
-engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx (last updated
July 9, 2013).
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7

that percentage has rocketed to 93%. Other crops that are
widely used in processed foods—from cooking oil to corn8
flakes—have followed similar trajectories. The Grocery Manufacturers Association estimates between 75% and 80% of conventional processed foods contain genetically modified
9
organisms (GMOs).
As GMOs pervade the marketplace without long-term, un10
biased research on their health impacts, more consumers are
demanding that they have a right to know if GMOs are present
11
in their food. Whole Foods recently announced it was responding to consumer demand by implementing mandatory labeling
of genetically modified food, making it the first major retailer to
12
require GMO labels. Ben & Jerry’s has announced that it will
13
stop use of GMO ingredients in its ice cream by 2015, and
Chipotle has begun disclosing use of GMOs on its website in an
14
effort to be transparent with consumers. On a larger scale, at
least sixty countries have implemented GMO labeling laws or
7. Id.
8. See id. (charting acreage of genetically engineered crops in the United
States).
9. Press Release, Whole Foods Market, Studies Show GMOs in Majority
of U.S. Processed Foods, 58 Percent of Americans Unaware of Issue (Oct. 7,
2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/studies-show
-gmos-in-majority-of-us-processed-foods-58-percent-of-americans-unaware-ofissue-104510549.html.
10. Cf. Chineme OK Anyadiegwu, Health Risks of Genetically Modified
Food: A Need for Unbiased Research into the Potential Health Risks of Genetically Engineered Crop Products, 13 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 203, 210–12
(2003) (arguing that a lack of critical assessment fuels consumer concern).
11. See Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. to Just Label It!
(Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://justlabelit.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/
Mellman-Survey-Results.pdf (finding that 91% of Americans support mandatory labeling of GMOs).
12. Stephanie Strom, Major Grocer to Label Foods with Gene-Modified
Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/
business/grocery-chain-to-require-labels-for-genetically-modified-food.html?
pagewanted=all&r=0. The labels, which will be implemented by 2018, have
not yet been created. Id.
13. Hunter Stewart, Ben & Jerry’s Will Stop Using Genetically-Modified
Ingredients, Company Says, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2013), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/02/ben-and-jerrys-gmos-genetically-modified_n_
3372451.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003.
14. Justin Bachman, The Genetically Modified Burrito: Chipotle Tells All,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-06-18/the-genetically-modified-burrito-chipotle-tells-all. Chipotle
also intends to reduce use of GMOs, but does not believe it can completely
eliminate them from its menus because of the nature of the U.S. food system.
Id.
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regulations. The United States federal government and
17
twenty-five states have also considered labeling requirements,
18
but none has implemented GMO label mandates to date.
19
California’s November 2012 GMO labeling ballot measure
brought national attention to the debate, although it failed to
20
pass by a narrow margin. Despite this letdown at the polls,
other states are continuing to pursue GMO labeling legisla21
tion. While states may be eager to step in to protect consum15. Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act, S. 809, 113th Cong.
§ 2 (2013).
16. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57
Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Statement of Policy]
(refusing to mandate labeling). Rep. Dennis Kucinich proposed amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in seven consecutive House sessions
to require food containing genetically engineered ingredients to be labeled accordingly, with no success. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act,
H.R. 3553, 112th Cong. (2011); Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know
Act, H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. (2010); Genetically Engineered Food Right to
Know Act, H.R. 6636, 110th Cong. (2008); Genetically Engineered Food Right
to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006); Genetically Engineered Food
Right to Know Act, H.R. 2916, 108th Cong. (2003); Genetically Engineered
Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 4814, 107th Cong. (2002); Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999). Most recently,
Sen. Barbara Boxer introduced the Genetically Engineered Food Right-toKnow Act in the Senate that would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require the FDA to promulgate mandatory labeling regulations
for GMOs. S. 809, 113th Cong. (2013). A companion bill was introduced in the
House by Rep. Peter DeFazio on the same day. Genetically Engineered Food
Right-to-Know Act, H.R. 1699, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill was referred to
committees in both the House and the Senate on April 24, 2013. Cong. Research Serv., All Actions H.R.1699—113th Congress (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV,
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/house-bill/1699/all
-actions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013); Cong. Research Serv., All Actions S.809—
113th Congress (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/
113th-congress/senate-bill/809/all-actions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
17. See Take Action in Your State, RIGHT TO KNOW GMO, http://www
.righttoknow-gmo.org/states (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (showing states’ GMO
labeling efforts).
18. Id.
19. The California Right to Know Genetically Engineered Food Act, 2012
Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 37 (rejected by voters on Nov. 6, 2012), available
at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf [hereinafter Proposition 37].
20. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 13 (2013),
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/sov-complete.pdf
(reporting that 51.4% voted against labeling and 48.6% voted in favor).
21. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 17; see also Mike Hughlett,
Bills Would Require Labels on Genetically Engineered Food in Minnesota,
STAR TRIB., Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.startribune.com/business/194056041
.html (describing genetically engineered labeling bills introduced in the Minnesota Legislature); Elaine Watson, New Mexico GMO Labeling Bill Heads for
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ers, such regulations may not pass constitutional muster. New
food labeling requirements could have considerable impact on
interstate commerce, raising potential Commerce Clause objec22
23
tions. Further, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act already provides for extensive regulation of food labeling, per24
haps implicating federal preemption. If states take a stand on
this issue, such regulations may not last for long.
This Note does not engage in the debate over the safety of
GMOs. Rather, it contends that if consumers desire labeling
mandates, such regulations must originate within the federal
government. Part I provides an overview of mandatory GMO
labeling, including proposed state regulations and the Food and
Drug Administration’s current stated position. Part II argues
that states do not have constitutional authority to enact GMO
labeling requirements. Finally, Part III addresses potential solutions and recommends voluntary labeling regulations with
binding standards to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
This Note concludes that state regulations requiring mandatory GMO labeling are unconstitutional, and urges the FDA to
respond to the growing concern by enacting realistic, uniform
regulations for labeling food produced from genetically engineered (GE) ingredients.
I. GMO REGULATIONS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
This Part introduces current and proposed regulations of
GMO labeling, and the constitutional framework for evaluating
such regulations. Section A provides an overview of the FDA’s
current position on GMOs compared to the agency’s historical
role. Section B summarizes various state proposals for labeling
genetically modified food. Finally, Section C introduces the conState Legislature, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www
.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/New-Mexico-GMO-labeling-bill-heads-for
-state-legislature (discussing mandatory labeling initiatives in New Mexico,
Washington, Oregon, Florida, and Connecticut in 2013).
22. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The
Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 312–14
(2006) (“State statutes that require labels on out-of-state products run the risk
of burdening interstate commerce and creating a lack of political accountability.”).
23. 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–343 (2006).
24. See generally Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Federal Pre-Emption of
State Food Labeling Legislation or Regulation, 79 A.L.R. FED. 181 (1986) (discussing cases pertaining to federal law preempting food labeling laws).
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stitutional considerations that state regulations will face if
passed.
A. FDA’S REGULATION OF GMOS (OR LACK THEREOF?)
The FDA is not a newcomer to the federal regulatory
25
world, though its role has adapted over the years. In its very
early years, starting from its establishment in 1848, the agency
(then the Agricultural Division of the Patent Office) served an
advisory role to other federal agencies on scientific and tech26
nical matters. The modern era of the FDA began in 1906 with
27
the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, which provided
the FDA with additional authority to enforce food and drug
28
standards in interstate commerce. The FDA at this time was
only an enforcement agency, without authority to promulgate
29
regulations or industry standards.
30
Growing frustration with the 1906 Act’s shortcomings
prompted Congress to pass the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos31
metic Act of 1938 (FDCA). The FDCA granted the FDA addi32
tional authority over medical devices and cosmetics, and pro33
vided for pre-market approval of drugs. Food regulations also
expanded, with the FDA receiving authorization to establish
34
enforceable standards for adulterated and misbranded food.
Section 341 grants authority to the FDA Secretary to promulgate and establish for most food “a reasonable definition and
standard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, or rea35
sonable standards of fill of container.” Adulterated food is de25. Paul Hyman, U.S. Food and Drug Law and FDA—A Historical Background, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 21, 63.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also FDA History: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/
ucm054819.htm (last updated June 18, 2009) (describing the scope of the Pure
Food and Drugs Act and the Bureau of Chemistry’s role in enforcing it).
30. Hyman, supra note 25, at 30.
31. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
32. Hyman, supra note 25, at 30, 35–36; see also FDA History: The 1938
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012).
33. Hyman, supra note 25, at 35; FDA History: The 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, supra note 32.
34. Hyman, supra note 25, at 34–35.
35. § 341. Exceptions to the FDA’s authority to establish a definition,
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fined in Section 342 as that containing “any poisonous or dele36
terious substance which may render it injurious to health,”
that which contains or may have been contaminated with
37
“filth,” or that which has been altered to increase its bulk or
38
value. Misbranded food is controlled under Section 343, which
39
prohibits “false or misleading” labels, requires imitation foods
40
to be clearly labeled as such, and mandates that foods subject
to FDA standards of identity, quality, and container fill must
41
conform to such standards.
The regulatory scheme of the 1938 Act is still largely in
place, though multiple amendments and acts have further ex42
panded and defined FDA authority related to food regulations.
The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 gave the FDA power to
43
require pre-approval of substances added to food. A food additive is defined as that which may reasonably become a component of the food or affect the food’s characteristics if it is “not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate its safety . . . to be safe un44
der the conditions of its intended use.” An exception to this
45
definition is substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS).
The FDA grants GRAS status if it can be shown “not only that
a substance is safe, but also that it is widely viewed as such by
46
experts in the field.” The Nutrition Labeling and Education
47
Act (NLEA) later overhauled food labeling requirements. The
NLEA provided for uniform, mandatory nutritional labeling
controlled by the FDA, with express federal preemption over
48
any non-identical state requirements.
standard of identity, and standard of quality are butter and fresh or dried
fruits and vegetables. Id.
36. § 342(a)(1).
37. § 342(a)(2).
38. § 342(b).
39. § 343(a).
40. § 343(c).
41. § 342(g)–(h).
42. Hyman, supra note 25, at 38.
43. § 348; Hyman, supra note 25, at 39.
44. § 321(s).
45. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(j) (2013).
46. Kracov & Glasser, supra note 1, at 272.
47. § 343-1; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-535, § 6, 104 Stat. 2353, 2362–64 (1990), available at http://uscode
.house.gov/statutes/1990/1990-101-0535.pdf.
48. § 343-1; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act § 6; Hyman, supra note
25, at 50.
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It is within this regulatory framework that the FDA considers the use in food of new plant varieties developed through
49
50
genetic modification. The FDA considers GMOs to be GRAS,
51
so premarket review as food additives is not mandatory unless
there is a “safety question sufficient to call into question the
52
presumed GRAS status.” However, voluntary premarket consultation is encouraged, under which the FDA primarily assesses:
1. Toxicants known to be characteristic of the host and donor species;
2. The potential that food allergens will be transferred from one food
source to another;
3. The concentration and bioavailability of important nutrients for
which a food crop is ordinarily consumed;
4. The safety and nutritional value of newly introduced proteins; and
5. The identity, composition and nutritional value of modified carbo53
hydrates, or fats and oils.

The process used to create the product is largely irrelevant
to the FDA, as it operates under the assumption that the prod54
uct itself is the key safety consideration.
The FDA considers genetic modification to be a “continuum” of traditional breeding used for centuries to selectively en55
courage favorable traits in plants. As such, the process of
plant breeding used is irrelevant as long as the resulting prod56
ucts are “substantially equivalent.” Taking the position that
49. See 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,988–89.
50. Id. at 22,990 (“With respect to transferred genetic material (nucleic
acids), generally FDA does not anticipate that transferred genetic material
would itself be subject to food additive regulation. Nucleic acids are present in
the cells of every living organism, including every plant and animal used for
food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety concern as a component
of food.”).
51. Kathleen A. Merrigan, Principles Driving U.S. Governance of
Agbiotech, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: INTERIM POLICIES, UNCERTAIN LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at 211.
52. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,990.
53. Id. at 22,992.
54. Eva Merian Spahn, Keep Away from Mouth: How the American System
of Food Regulation Is Killing Us, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 694–95 (2011) (arguing for an overhaul of the U.S. food regulation scheme, including the adoption of a heightened duty of care for food producers).
55. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,985–86 (explaining the
FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA relating to GMOs).
56. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SAFETY EVALUATION OF
FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY 14 (1993), available at http://
www.oecd.org/science/biosafety-biotrack/41036698.pdf (“The concept of substantial equivalence embodies the idea that existing organisms used as food,
or as a source of food, can be used as the basis for comparison when assessing
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GMOs do not “present any different or greater safety concern
than foods developed by traditional plant breeding,” the FDA
57
does not require labeling to disclose genetic modification.
Such labeling would only be required if the new plant variety
constituted misbranding by “differ[ing] from its traditional
counterpart such that the common or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue exists to
58
which consumers must be alerted.” Those producers who wish
to voluntarily label (whether indicating the use of bioengineering or lack thereof) may do so, and the FDA has released non59
binding guidance to help direct such labeling. The FDA suggests that statements such as “GMO free” may be misleading
without a uniform threshold level for GMOs above which the
60
label cannot be used, which does not currently exist. However,
despite consumer support for GMO labeling, the FDA does not
61
require it without a showing of adverse health effects. In
short, while the FDA has authority over food in interstate
commerce and its labeling, it has yet to proceed beyond nonbinding recommendations when it comes to GMOs.
B. STATES’ STANCES ON GMO LABELS
State governments, on the other hand, have been eager to
step in and take a stand on GMOs. In 2011 and 2012, nineteen
62
states considered mandatory GMO labeling legislation. Two
the safety of human consumption of a food or food component that has been
modified or is new.”).
57. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,991 ( “[T]he agency does
not believe that the method of development of a new plant variety . . . is normally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 321(n) and would
not usually be required to be disclosed in labeling for the food.”).
58. Id.
59. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods
Have or Have not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance, FDA,
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Guidance
DocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm
(last
updated Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Draft Guidance].
60. See id.; see also DETECTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS:
CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF TESTING TO RESOLVE A BIOTECH FOOD FIGHT,
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
Summaries_-_reports_and_pubs/proceedings2.pdf (“[N]either protein testing
nor DNA testing by themselves are sufficient to reach conclusions about the
amount of GMOs present in shipment of grain or a truckload of tortillas.”).
61. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,991.
62. Ronnie Cummins, Letter to Organic Consumer, Posted in Organic
Bytes, ORGANICCONSUMERS.ORG, http://organicconsumers.org/letter-9-18.htm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
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states—California and Oregon—took the issue directly to the
voters through ballot initiatives. California’s Proposition 37,
63
billed as the “Right to Know” Act, received strong early back64
65
ing, but failed at the polls. Supporters of the “Right to Know”
Act attribute the loss to the last-minute injection of corporate
funds from agro-chemical companies, such as Monsanto, to
66
fight the initiative. The “No on 37” campaign outspent the la67
beling supporters five-to-one. Those against the ballot measure, however, declared it the result of logic and science winning
68
out over fear. In Oregon, voters struck down a similar ballot
69
initiative in 2002. Despite early polls showing 58% of voters
70
supported the measure, 70.5% of voters rejected the bill. In
addition, New Mexico’s legislature debated an amendment to
the New Mexico Food Act requiring labeling for GMOs, but the
71
measure died on the Senate floor on January 31, 2013.
Despite these past defeats, states have continued to push
for GMO labeling mandates. Vermont’s House passed a bill to
require GMO labels, which the Senate is not expected to con72
sider until January 2014. Connecticut and Maine both suc63. Proposition 37, supra note 19.
64. Cal. Bus. Roundtable & Pepperdine Univ., Initiative Survey Series
2012, CAL. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, http://www.cbrt.org/initiative-survey-series
-2012/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (showing that 69.4% of voters supported the
initiative on Aug. 2, 2012).
65. Marc Lifsher, California Voters Say No to Labeling Genetically Engineered Food, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/07/
business/la-fi-mo-genetically-engineered-food-labeling-20121107.
66. Lynne Peeples, Prop 37 GMO Labeling Law Defeated by Corporate
Dollars and Deception, Proponents Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/proposition-37-gmo-labeling_n_
2090112.html (“Prior to the opposition's $46 million push, proponents had held
a consistent two-fold lead in the polls.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting a statement from Dr. Henry I. Miller of the Hoover Institution, a think tank at Stanford University).
69. KERRY-ANN T. POWELL, VOTERS IN SEVEN CALIFORNIA COUNTIES
CONSIDER BANNING GENETICALLY ENGINEERED AGRICULTURE 8 (2004), available at http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/California%20Counties_
GE_Ag_USPIRG.pdf.
70. Id.
71. See Elaine Watson, Lobbying by Agri-Business Killed New Mexico
GMO Labeling Bill, Claim Supporters, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Feb. 05,
2013),
http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/Lobbying-by-agri
-business-killed-New-Mexico-GMO-labeling-Bill-claim-supporters. See generally S.B. 18, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013).
72. Andrew Stein, GMO Labeling Bill Positioned for Action Next Session,
VTDIGGER.ORG (May 7, 2013), http://vtdigger.org/2013/05/07/gmo-labeling-bill
-positioned-for-action-next-session/.
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ceeded in passing labeling bills in early 2013; however, the regulations will not go into effect unless other states, including a
73
neighboring state, pass similar bills. GMO labeling supporters
in Washington submitted over 350,000 signatures—100,000
more than necessary to qualify an initiative to the Legisla74
ture—in support of genetically modified food labels. The Legislature had an opportunity to pass the initiative as written,
but took no action; the decision now turns to the voters on the
75
November 2013 general election ballot. Further, GMO label
supporters are gaining ground in Oregon, Florida, and Minne76
sota to pursue legislation. While no label mandates have tak77
78
en effect yet, wide voter support across party lines suggests
legislation will likely continue coming to the floor and cropping
up in ballot initiatives.
The proposed state legislation has largely followed the
same formula. First, the bills require genetically engineered
food to be labeled as such. In Colorado, the mandatory language was either “genetically engineered” or “This product contains or was produced with a genetically engineered materi79
al.” Connecticut specified that raw agricultural commodities
should be labeled “Genetically Engineered,” while processed
food should indicate “Partially Produced with Genetic Engineering” or “May be Partially Produced with Genetic Engineer73. Elaine Watson, Maine House Backs GMO Labeling Bill, FOOD NAVI(June 12, 2013), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/
Regulation/Maine-House-backs-GMO-labeling-bill. Maine’s bill requires five
contiguous states to pass similar legislation in order to go into effect. Id. Connecticut would require four other states with an aggregate population of at
least twenty million and at least one state must be neighboring. Jessica Corbett, GMO Domino Effect, IN THESE TIMES (Jul. 14, 2013), http://www
.inthesetimes.com/article/15225/gmo_domino_effect/.
74. Jim Camden, State May Vote on GMO Labeling, THE SPOKESMANREV., Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/jan/04/state-may
-vote-on-gmo-labeling/.
75. Dan Flynn, Campaign for GM Food Labeling Gets New State Battleground, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (April 29, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/
2013/04/olympias-inaction-sets-up-re-match-for-gm-food-labeling/.
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. See Helena Bottemiller, With Recent Victories, Movement to Label
GMOs Gains Steam, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://www
.foodsafetynews.com/2013/06/movement-to-label-gmos-gainingsteam/#.UiuxMsbEPVk.
78. Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc., supra note 11, at 1
(finding in a survey of 1,000 2012 general election voters that 93% of Democrats, 89% of Republicans, and 90% of independents are in favor of labeling).
79. S. 01-146, 63d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 25-5-411 (Colo. 2001).
GATOR-USA.COM
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80

ing.” Hawaii’s legislature has heard at least seven labeling
81
bills, which would have required labels to state “THIS
PRODUCT CONTAINS A GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
MATERIAL, OR WAS PRODUCED WITH A GENETICALLY
82
ENGINEERED MATERIAL.” In addition to specific language,
the bills specify the size and appearance of the disclaimer.
Washington’s legislation detailed that the label “must appear
either: (a) On the front package or label of any such commodity;
or (b) In the case of such a commodity that is not separately
packaged or labeled, on a label appearing on the retail store
83
84
shelf or bin.” Some states stipulate specific font sizes, while
others, such as Vermont, simply require the statement to be
“prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness . . . as
to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary
85
individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.”
The state legislation also defines what is to be considered
genetically modified food. Colorado’s proposed bill provides for
the definition to shift with advances of science:
“Genetically engineered food” means the following: (a) All foods derived in whole or in part from a genetically engineered virus, microorganism, plant, livestock, or other organism if such genetically engineered material can be detected at a level at least twice the limits of
detection of the most sensitive method commercially available for de86
tection of that particular type of genetically engineered material.

New Mexico would require labeling for any food where “genetically engineered material accounts for more than one-tenth
87
percent of the weight of any portion of that food.” Others
simply state that food is genetically modified if any ingredient

80. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(a) (Conn. 2012).
81. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, LEGISLATION TRACKER 2006 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_Legislative_
Tracker.pdf.
82. See, e.g., H.R. 2034, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 328(a) (Haw. 2012).
83. S. 6298, 62d Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2012).
84. See, e.g., H.R. 2808, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. § 2 Subd.1. (Minn. 2012)
(requiring the GE label to be “in boldface print of not less than ten-point
type”).
85. H.R. 722, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4060(a)(6) (Vt. 2012).
86. S. 01-146, 63d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 25-5-402(12.3) (Colo.
2001).
87. S. 906, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. § 4(A) (N.M. 2005); cf. Proposition 37, supra note 19 (providing an exception for processed food where no GMOs “account[] for more than one-half of one percent of the total weight” and there are
no more than ten genetically engineered ingredients).
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88

is produced with genetic engineering. States differ on whether
to consider animals fed with genetically modified materials as
89
genetically modified food themselves. Finally, the proposed
bills provide that violations of the labeling mandate will be a
90
misdemeanor.
States thus have very similar ideas about what GMO labeling should look like. Despite this apparent meeting of the
minds, however, states may not have the authority to regulate
in this arena.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES FOR STATE REGULATIONS
Even if a state capitalizes on the public demand for GMO
labels and passes a bill mandating disclosure, the legislation
may not withstand constitutional challenges. While the federal
government largely works alongside state governments to regu91
late food, state regulations must still comply with the limits of
the Commerce Clause and federal preemption or risk invalida92
tion.
1. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
93
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The Supreme Court’s judicial oversight has delineated over the years the extent to
94
which Congress’s power may restrict state regulation. The
Commerce Clause itself is a grant of power—not a prohibition
on state regulation unless Congress elects to regulate the ar95
ea. The modern view of the Commerce Clause allows Congress
88. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 1(3) (Conn. 2012).
89. Compare H.R. 4025, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1105(a)(xvi) (Mich. 2001)
(stipulating that food derived from an animal fed with or treated with GMOs
is itself genetically modified), with H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(c)(1)
(Conn. 2012) (creating an exception for animals “fed or injected with any genetically-engineered food”).
90. See, e.g., H.R. 2808, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. § 2 Subd. 5 (Minn. 2012).
91. Fred H. Degnan, The Food and Drug Administration—How It Is Organized and Works, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW
AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 118.
92. See Edward P. Richards, III, Overview of the U.S. Legal System, in A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION, supra
note 1, at 2–3 (explaining federal commerce powers).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
94. Richards, supra note 92, at 2.
95. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cas-
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to “(1) Regulate the channels of interstate commerce; (2) protect
the ‘instrumentalities,’ persons, and things involved with interstate commerce from any threat; and, (3) regulate those activi96
ties having a ‘substantial relation to interstate commerce.’”
The Court has also held that state regulations may be further restrained—even if Congress has not acted—under the
97
concept of the “Dormant” Commerce Clause. A court’s inquiry
under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge has two consid98
erations. The first consideration is if the regulation is discrim99
inatory between in-state and out-of-state economic inter100
ests.
If it is discriminatory, it is virtually per se
101
unconstitutional. If it is facially neutral, the court proceeds to
the second consideration, applying a balancing standard to determine whether the “local benefits outweigh the incidental
102
burdens to interstate commerce.” The court should particularly consider a regulation’s effects on interstate commerce if
103
multiple states were to regulate in the same area, and if a
104
less burdensome regulation could achieve the same benefit.
2. Federal Preemption
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be considered a form
105
of implied preemption. However, preemption extends beyond
es, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009).
96. Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot
Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 418
(2003) (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)).
97. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–80
(1995).
98. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 571, 573–74 (1997).
99. Id.
100. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
101. O’Grady, supra note 98, at 574.
102. Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate over Genetically Modified Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-toKnow Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 156, 181–82 (2003).
103. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526–30 (1959) (stating
that the existence of conflicting regulations in neighboring states must be considered when assessing a regulation’s potential burden on interstate commerce).
104. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (examining
the constitutional conflicts of state regulations for hormone-produced milk);
see also Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating Recombinant bST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 294 (1997).
105. See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118.
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the Commerce Clause. Preemption occurs in areas of shared
106
regulatory power where state and federal laws conflict. When
this occurs, federal law takes priority, and inconsistent state
107
regulations are null and void.
Preemption takes on four
108
forms: implied, express, field, and conflict. Implied preemption exists where the federal government has authority over the
area pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce
109
Clause. Express preemption occurs where a federal law ex110
plicitly bars states from regulating in that area. For instance,
the NLEA provides that “no State or political subdivision of a
State may directly or indirectly establish under any authority
or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce” cer111
tain requirements for food or labeling covered under the Act.
The court will then consider whether the state regulation is
112
within the scope of the federal regulation and thus invalid.
Conflict preemption occurs where there is no express
statement in the law, but the state and federal regulations
113
cannot both be followed. Conflict preemption does not mean
that a state cannot regulate in the area, just that competing
114
purposes prevent the state’s particular regulation.
Field
115
preemption is “a species of conflict pre-emption.” In these
cases, there is not a direct conflict, but Congress has “so com116
pletely occupied the field” that there is “no room” for state
117
regulation. If Congress has occupied the field, it completely
bars states from regulating in the area as deference to Congress’s determination that state exclusion is necessary and
118
proper.
State regulations thus face significant constitutional hurdles when regulating areas Congress has acted in or that may
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Richards, supra note 92, at 4.
See id.; see also Degnan, supra note 91, at 118.
Kinley Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 999 F.2d 354, 358 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993).
See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118.
See Richards, supra note 92, at 4.
21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
See Robertson, supra note 102, at 166.
Burk, supra note 104, at 250.
Id. at 250–51.
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984).
See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 72 (1988) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
118. Id. at 72–73.

370

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:356

be considered Congress’s sole territory. As Part II will show,
this likely poses a significant barrier to states’ attempts to impose mandatory GMO labeling.
II. STATE GMO LAWS CANNOT WITHSTAND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
This Part considers whether constitutional concerns invalidate state GMO regulations. First, Section A analyzes state
labeling laws’ impact on interstate commerce under a Dormant
Commerce Clause balancing test. Section B then addresses
whether federal labeling regulations preempt state regulations.
This Part concludes that state regulations are likely barred
both under a Dormant Commerce Clause evaluation and under
federal preemption considerations.
A. MANDATORY LABELS IMPROPERLY TIP THE BALANCE OF
LOCAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL IMPACTS
When courts evaluate claims that a state regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, the first inquiry is if the
119
regulation is facially discriminatory. For example, a Massachusetts law that imposed a tax on milk but provided a subsidy
to in-state producers was considered discriminatory because
the tax was “effectively imposed only on out-of-state prod120
ucts.” In the case of state GMO label requirements, manufacturers both in and out of the state equally bear the cost and duty of labeling food products, and thus they are unlikely to be
121
overruled as discriminatory. To the extent that the regulations favor manufacturers and growers who do not use genetically engineered crops, such as the organic food industry, the
122
impact is not limited to in-state producers.
However, such regulations must still be considered under
123
the Pike balancing test. The balancing test considers whether
a state’s interest is sufficient to allow the incidental burden on

119. See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
120. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994).
121. See Keane, supra note 22, at 313.
122. See Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1003 (2d Cir. 1985);
see also Robertson, supra note 102, at 183.
123. See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (stating that the Pike balancing test applies
where there are legitimate state concerns with incidental effects on interstate
commerce).
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124

interstate commerce to continue. If there is a legitimate local
interest, then courts look to the extent of the burden and if alternate actions could promote the same interest with a lesser
125
impact.
1. Local Interests
The purpose and design of state GMO regulations, supporters argue, is to allow consumers to make informed choices
about what they eat and protect consumers since GMOs have
126
not been affirmatively proven safe. Courts have previously
found that consumer education and protection is a legitimate
127
state interest. This interest lies within the states’ police pow128
er to protect its citizens’ health and welfare. However, it is
unclear whether GMOs pose any threat to health and wel129
fare. If GMOs pose no greater risk than traditional food, it
casts doubt on states’ ability to regulate them separately under
130
the guise of consumer protection. Without health and safety
concerns, the state’s interest relies on protecting consumers’
right to know what is in their food. Courts have held that this
131
alone is insufficient to support labeling mandates. The FDA
124. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
125. Id.
126. Facts—Yes on Prop 37, CAL. RIGHT TO KNOW, http://www
.carighttoknow.org/facts (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
127. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am., 755 F.2d at 1003–04 (holding that distinguishing between real cheese and alternative cheese is a legitimate state
concern).
128. Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and
Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 652 (1994).
129. Compare Chelsea Snell et al., Assessment of the Health Impact of GM
Plant Diets in Long-Term and Multigenerational Animal Feeding Trials: A
Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1143 (2012)
(“[T]he available long-term studies do not yield new safety concerns [compared
to 90-day studies] and confirm that the studied GM varieties (most of them are
major commercial products) are nutritionally equivalent to their non-GM conventional counterparts.”), with Anyadiegwu, supra note 10, at 210 (“Some effects of new technology are visible and dramatic, but many are delayed and
uncertain. Therefore, an assessment of such risk and the design of strategies
to reduce them require the use of scientific and technical information.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. But see Robertson, supra note 102, at 182 (arguing that Right to Know
acts are constitutional and within the scope of states’ police power).
131. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir.
1996) (“Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the information that states could require manufacturers to disclose about their production methods.”).
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maintains that genetically engineered foods do not present any
“different or greater safety concerns” than conventionally bred
132
foods. Courts give significant deference to the FDA’s scientific
133
judgment, and therefore would be unlikely to find substantial
state interest unless presented with scientific evidence of safety
134
risks.
2. National Burdens
Assuming in the alternative that states have a local interest in GMO regulations—albeit one weakened by a lack of definitive safety risks—the courts will then determine if the bur135
dens on interstate commerce exceed the intrastate benefits.
The burden of such labeling mandates stands to be significant.
If California, for instance, was to pass GMO laws, it would af136
fect 12% of the nation’s food market. Food producers would
have to evaluate the cost of changing their labels for one state
137
compared to the cost of simply avoiding California. In the
past, California regulations have not remained isolated in Cali138
fornia. There are several possible explanations for this California effect: “[E]ither because its regulations or bans encourage other states or the federal government to adopt them, or
because they force producers to change their offerings nationwide, or because they force the regulated industry to seek
139
preemptive nationwide regulation.” Whatever the reason may
be, California’s GMO regulations will likely reverberate na140
tionwide.
132. Letter from Lester M. Crawford, Deputy Comm’r, FDA, to John A.
Kitzhaber, Governor, Or. (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.bio.org/
sites/default/files/Kitzhaber.pdf.
133. See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179
(D.D.C. 2000).
134. Cf. id. (suggesting that if the FDA’s position was shown to be irrational, e.g., by the production of contrary scientific evidence, it would not be entitled to deference).
135. See O’Grady, supra note 98, at 574.
136. Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American
Food: How California's Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the
State & the Nation, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (2010).
137. Cf. id. at 358 (“Companies that can no longer market a food in California may be forced to decide whether that product—robbed of twelve percent
of its potential market—is still viable.”).
138. Id. at 384–85. For example, when California banned trans fats, many
state and local governments subsequently introduced similar measures. Id. at
378.
139. Id. at 384–85.
140. See id. at 389 (“California’s mushrooming food and agricultural regu-
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This effect has been observed in other states as well. Until
2011, a Pennsylvania regulation required bread producers to
print a mark evidencing registration with the state on all bread
141
packaging.
Producers with multi-state operations found it
cheaper and simpler to include this marking on all packag142
ing. However, the inconspicuous language “Reg. Penna. Dept.
143
Agr.” likely had a more neutral impact on consumers than a
label such as Connecticut’s proposed “Partially Produced with
144
Genetic Engineering” label. If consumers see GMOs as a decision factor in their purchases, such labeling operates as a
145
warning as it “clearly suggests one choice over another.” Labeling mandates can thus influence consumer purchases nationwide even if only passed in one state. The impact may be
magnified if multiple states pass different labeling requirements, which could require packaging to contain several variously worded GMO warnings in order to comply with all regu146
lations.
GMO label supporters argue that labeling changes occur
frequently and the changes required by the mandate would en147
tail no cost to the producers. But the cost of a new label is not
the only cost involved—producers must know whether their
products contain GMOs in order to comply with labeling re148
quirements. This entails segregation of GE and non-GE crops
all the way from farmer to producer, which would mean infrastructure modifications, including separating crops (potentially
requiring buffer land to avoid cross-pollination), establishing
lations and bans—the result of the state’s propensity toward hyper-regulation
and the resultant California effect—are spreading across America.”).
141. See Pennsylvania Food Act, 31 PA. STAT. §§ 20.1–20.18 (1994), repealed by Act 106 of 2010, P.L. 1039, No. 106 § 8 (2010). Pennsylvania law now
states, “The secretary may promulgate regulations allowing food establishments to label their food products as having been registered by the department.” 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5735 (2010) (emphasis added).
142. Linnekin, supra note 136, at 377.
143. See generally 7 PA. CODE § 46.3 (2004).
144. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(a) (Conn. 2012).
145. Donna M. Byrne, Cloned Meat, Voluntary Food Labeling, and Organic
Oreos, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 31, 36, 77–78 (2009) (“When presented with information on a label, assuming they notice it, and they do not always notice it,
the unknowing consumers tend to perceive the label information as a warning.
The label does two things—it tells them there is an issue of concern, serving
an educational function, and it warns them about this product.” (footnote
omitted)).
146. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 653.
147. Facts—Yes on Prop 37, supra note 126.
148. See Byrne, supra note 145, at 69.
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distinct storage and processing facilities, and transporting GE
149
and non-GE crops separately. Opponents of California’s nowrejected labeling initiative estimate that if non-GE ingredients
replace GE ingredients, the cost to consumers would be a mid150
point of at least $348 per California household.
Evaluating the impact in other countries that have imposed GMO labeling mandates can further illuminate potential
burdens on interstate commerce. A study of the impact of voluntary versus mandatory labeling found that “[M]andatory labelling in the European Union (EU) has resulted in the virtual
disappearance of any GM-labelled product, so in practice EU
151
consumers do not have a choice when they go shopping.”
Mandatory labeling in Japan similarly resulted in an effective
152
elimination of GM products.
History thus indicates that
mandatory labeling could destroy a segment of the food mar153
ket. This potential lack of choice, combined with the price increases forced on all consumers, poses a significant burden on
interstate commerce that outweighs the state benefit of in154
formed shoppers.
As such, since mandatory state GMO labels would encumber purchases and food supplies nationwide, as well as increasing costs from farmers all the way up to consumers, the regulations would likely fail a Dormant Commerce Clause balancing
test. These burdens on interstate commerce exceed any possible
149. See NORTHBRIDGE ENVTL. MGMT. CONSULTANTS, THE GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED FOODS MANDATORY LABELING INITIATIVE 20–22 (Jul. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.noprop37.com/files/Prop.-37-Will-Raise-Grocery-Bills
-400-Annually.pdf.
150. See id. at 7, 34 (stating that two possible compliance scenarios result
in costs of $401 and $348 per household, respectively). But cf. Debra M.
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 192
(2006) (“The estimated costs for the more extensive GM labeling options under
consideration in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia were calculated as $3 to $10 a year per person.”).
151. Guillaume P. Gruère et al., What Labelling Policy for Consumer
Choice? The Case of Genetically Modified Food in Canada and Europe, 41
CANADIAN J. ECON. 1472, 1474 (2008).
152. Guillaume P. Gruère & S.R. Rao, A Review of International Labeling
Policies of Genetically Modified Food to Evaluate India’s Proposed Rule, 10
AGBIOFORUM 51, 54 (2007).
153. See id. Gruère and Rao observe that China appears to be the only
country with mandatory labeling where GM products are still readily available. Id. at 54 n.2.
154. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the weakness of a
consumer curiosity interest).
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local interest of informing consumers.
B. FDA LABEL REGULATIONS LEAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR STATE
MANDATES
If courts do not invalidate state labeling mandates under
the implied preemption of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the
regulations would likely still be unconstitutional through express or field preemption.
Express preemption seems like a simple case—either the
federal law precludes state interference with explicit language
or it does not. An actual express preemption consideration,
however, is not so simple, as courts must scrutinize the explicit
language to determine the boundaries of the preemptive
155
scope. Courts have not yet considered whether the express
156
preemption of the NLEA would extend to state GMO labels,
157
but such an interpretation is unlikely.
To determine the
158
scope of preemption, courts will look to congressional intent.
When passing the NLEA, Congress specifically limited the
scope to nutritional labeling because extending the scope to
159
warning labels posed a danger to the Act’s passage. As Senator Orrin Hatch explained, “[T]he compromise makes clear that
the national uniformity in food labeling that is set forth in the
legislation has absolutely no effect on preemption of State or
local requirements that relate to such things as warnings about
160
foods or components of food.” Further, Congress was explicit
within the Act that its preemption was limited to the scope de161
fined therein, leaving little wiggle room. Congress did not
162
want to ban states entirely from food labeling, especially considering its reliance on states to help enforce FDA regula163
tions. Even if the Act omitted this preemption limitation, the
mere existence of any express preemption statement precludes
164
implied preemption to expand the scope further.
155. See Burk, supra note 104, at 249–50.
156. Robertson, supra note 102, at 165.
157. Cf. Burk, supra note 104, at 249 (“[I]n each instance the two interests
will be balanced, accommodating local regulation wherever possible.”).
158. Id. at 166.
159. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 659–60.
160. 136 CONG. REC. 33,429 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
161. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (explicitly listing what state and local
governments may not do under the Act); see also Burk, supra note 104, at 258.
162. See Burk, supra note 104, at 259.
163. See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118–19.
164. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). But see
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However, even if the NLEA does not preempt state GMO
labels, preemption may still be found in other federal regula165
tions. The entire scope of food regulations—expanding beyond
the NLEA—could implicate field preemption, in that Congress
166
has so occupied the field as to exclude states from regulating.
Neither the motive behind the state regulation nor its result is
relevant; field preemption prevents any state regulations in
that field, even if the regulations “appear to support or further
167
the purpose of the federal statutes.” As with express preemption, courts typically look to congressional intent to determine
168
if field preemption is applicable. As the congressional record,
169
discussed earlier, demonstrates, excluding states from the
170
realm of labeling was not Congress’s intent. This stated intent may be enough to overcome field preemption arguments,
171
as there is a “strong presumption against preemption.”
However, the Court recently has deviated from this tradi172
tional preemption analysis in some cases. In AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion, for example, the Court found that one of the
Agency’s objectives was to “protect corporations from hostile
173
courts and interfering tort actions.” The Court held that a
clause reserving state regulations could not uphold regulations
174
that stood as an obstacle to that objective. Courts could simiFreightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287–89 (1995) (arguing that express preemption suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt other matters, but does not foreclose all possibility of implied preemption).
165. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 660.
166. See Burk, supra note 104, at 251 (citing Wolfson, supra note 117, at
77–78) (discussing a “delicate balance” theory, according to which some courts
will reject state or local legislation in an otherwise open area to avoid disrupting the delicate balance of an apparently precise legislative scheme).
167. See id. at 250.
168. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (considering
whether a state law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63.
170. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 33,428–29 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch).
171. Bradley, supra note 128, at 658.
172. Pamela A. Vesilind, Emerging Constitutional Threats to Food Labeling
Reform, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 68 (2012) (“[T]he analyses bypassed
any substantive discussion or application of the traditional presumption that
state police powers are preserved absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.”).
173. Id. at 70.
174. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s judicial rule declaring class arbitration waivers unconscionable).
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larly find an objective in federal food regulation laws to protect
producers from having to comply with and defend against regulations varying from state to state. Senator Hatch argued as
much when introducing the NLEA on the Senate floor:
[I]t is wrong to permit each of the 50 States to require manufacturers
of 20,000 packaged food items to display different health and diet information on identical products sold throughout this country. And, it
is wrong to burden the manufacturer with the fear of potentially 50
different lawsuits from 50 different State attorneys general, even if
175
similar cases have been dismissed or settled.

If courts read such an objective into the NLEA, then state
GMO laws may be considered an extension of this concern.
Thus, states could be preempted as an obstacle to Congress’s
intent despite the reservation of states’ power to create and enforce additional labeling requirements.
In addition to congressional intent, courts reviewing state
GMO laws will likely consider the position of the FDA, which
176
the Court has found to be “dispositive” regarding preemption.
The Court held in Medtronic v. Lohr that the FDA is “uniquely
qualified” to make this determination as “the federal agency to
which Congress has delegated its authority to implement the
177
provisions of the Act.”
The FDA maintains that labeling
GMOs is unnecessary and potentially misleading in the ab178
sence of scientific evidence of safety risks. This position has
been set forth in guidance documents that, though not binding,
179
are still entitled to deference by the courts. The FDA’s position is that the presence of genetically modified ingredients is
180
not material and thus does not require special labeling, a decision informed by the Agency’s expertise in food regulations.
This determination should not be limited to federal regulations,
but should extend to bar state regulations, and should play a
significant role in courts’ determination of field preemption.
If looking solely to congressional intent, the argument for
express or field preemption is weak. However, when the expert
175. 136 CONG. REC. 33,428 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
176. Eric G. Lasker, FDA Position on Federal Preemption Consistent with
Law and Public Health, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 25, 2005, at 1, 3 (quoting Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714
(1985)).
177. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996).
178. Draft Guidance, supra note 59.
179. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1002 (2d Cir.
1985) (“The distinctions between formal rules and interpretive rules or general
statements of policy are often vague.”).
180. Draft Guidance, supra note 59.
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opinion of the FDA—granted its authority by Congress—is justifiably taken into consideration, it is likely that courts will find
states have been preempted from the field of mandatory GMO
labels. Coupled with state labeling regulations’ impact on interstate commerce, a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
would likely also block state GMO regulations. These two significant constitutional concerns stand as a substantial barrier
to mandatory GMO labeling originating in state governments.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS SHOULD SPUR THE
FDA TO STEP UP AND STEP IN
This Part argues that FDA implementation of GMO labeling is preferable to state regulations. Section A argues that
consumer demand is an important factor that the FDA can and
should consider as an impetus for labeling. Section B suggests a
reasonable labeling scheme should be voluntary and should
measure GMO presence in finished products. Such a program
balances consumer concern with manufacturing burdens.
A. THE FDA SHOULD REMOVE STATES’ TEMPTATION TO
REGULATE AND ADDRESS CONSUMER DEMAND
Regardless of the constitutional consequences of state regulations, federal regulation is the preferable method to answer
consumer concern regarding GMOs. In response to Oregon’s
GMO labeling initiative in 2002, the FDA itself argued that
such state GMO label mandates are improper because they
would “require different labels for different states impeding the
181
free flow of commerce between the states.” FDA regulation of
GMOs, conversely, would create uniformity in labeling and relieve producers of the burden of a muddled system of state reg182
ulations. The FDA has asserted its authority over monitoring
183
the safety of the nation’s food supply. However, because it
views GMOs as essentially the same as their conventional
counterparts, the FDA does not believe they fall under this
184
safety umbrella.
If the FDA cannot regulate GMOs under safety concerns,
181. Crawford, supra note 132, at 1.
182. See Erik Benny, “Natural” Modifications: The FDA’s Need to Promulgate an Official Definition of “Natural” that Includes Genetically Modified Organisms, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1504, 1516–17 (2012) (arguing for similar
FDA regulation of the use of “natural” on food labels).
183. Crawford, supra note 132, at 1.
184. Id.
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then can the FDA regulate because of consumer demand? It
thinks not. Its current position is that federal regulations cannot be upheld simply on consumer demand unless a material
185
difference first sparks that demand. This has not always been
the FDA’s position, however. The FDA requires labeling of food
treated with irradiation even though it has determined that
186
“there is no concern about the safety of such treatment.” This
label mandate is thus based not on safety, but on consumer
concern. The Agency explicitly credited consumer concern as
the motive behind this regulation. “[T]he large number of consumer comments requesting retail labeling attest to the significance placed on such information by consumers. . . . Because of
these comments, FDA had decided to require that the label and
labeling of food products bear the appropriate statements to in187
form consumers that the food has been irradiated.”
The FDA also found such labeling valuable because con188
sumers cannot observe irradiation without labeling.
The
same argument can be made for GMOs. The FDA received 1.1
million signatures related to Just Label It’s petition for GMO
189
labeling. Despite the large number of consumer comments—
190
more than any previous petition filed with the FDA —the
FDA’s response was simply that it needs more time to make a
191
decision. The FDCA has not changed since the decision to label irradiated foods in 1986, so the motivation behind the
FDA’s dismissal of consumer concern in the case of GMOs is
192
unclear. Since the FDA has previously regulated based on
193
consumer concern, and a large segment of the population is
185. See Burk, supra note 104, at 271.
186. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51
Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (Apr. 18, 1986).
187. Id.
188. Strauss, supra note 150, at 184.
189. FDA Responds to 1.1 Million, JUST LABEL IT (Apr. 5, 2012), http://
justlabelit.org/fda-responds-to-1-1-million/. See generally Docket No. FDA2011-P-0723-0001/CP.
190. Monica Eng, FDA Finally Responds to GMO-Labeling Campaign but
Differs on Numbers of Supporters, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2012, http://www
.chicagotribune.com/features/food/stew/chi-gmolabeling-campaign-claims-amillion-supporters-but-fda-doesnt-agree-20120328,0,1662591.story. While over
one million people submitted comments, those submitted via the petition were
officially counted as one comment since these names were signed to identical
form letters. Id. As such, the FDA contends it received only 394 comments. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cf. David Alan Nauheim, Food Labeling and the Consumer’s Right to
Know: Give the People What They Want, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 97, 125 (2009).
193. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 179 (2013); supra notes 186–87 and accompany-

380

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:356

194

concerned about GMOs, the FDA should reverse course and
establish labeling regulations despite a lack of known safety
risk.
B. A FEDERAL GMO LABELING REGULATION SHOULD BALANCE
CONSUMER INTERESTS AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A regulation fueled by curiosity rather than necessity
should be moderate in scope. This consideration should influence the FDA’s implementation of GMO regulations. The two
biggest decisions in designing a labeling law are (1) whether it
should be mandatory or voluntary and (2) when to measure
GMO presence. This Section argues for voluntary labeling with
GMO presence tested on the finished product as a solution that
balances consumer concern and production burdens.
1. Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Current international labeling regimes can be a helpful
starting point for developing a labeling program for the United
States. There is not an early leader in popularity between
195
mandatory versus voluntary systems. Jurisdictions such as
Canada, Hong Kong, and South Africa have adopted voluntary
plans, while mandatory requirements are in place in Australia,
196
Japan, Brazil, and China. The EU, operating under a view
that GMOs are not safe until proven so, has a mandatory re197
gime requiring labels on food produced with GMOs. When
coupled with a negative perception of GMOs, however, mandatory labeling can push genetically modified (GM) food out of the
198
market. Mandatory labeling of GMOs also has the effect of
raising prices, as practices of the entire market must change to
199
accommodate the new requirements.
Voluntary labeling indicating an absence of GMOs, on the
other hand, passes the costs on to those parties who spurred
ing text.
194. THOMSON REUTERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS:
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD (Oct. 2010), available at http://www
.justlabelit.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/NPR_report_GeneticEngineered
Food-1.pdf. The survey of more than 100,000 U.S. households found that
14.6% view genetically engineered foods as not safe and 64.1% are unsure of
their safety, with 93.1% supporting labeling of such foods. Id.
195. See Gruère & Rao, supra note 152, at 52–53.
196. Id. at 52.
197. Spahn, supra note 54, at 695–96.
198. See Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1492–94.
199. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 192.
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the change and value the information—consumers who want
200
non-GM foods and producers who want to woo them. The
FDA should take this approach since there is little scientific evidence of a pressing concern that would necessitate GMO label201
ing with the exception of consumer desire. Some argue that
this cost should be borne by those who benefit from GM technology and consequently advocate for labels indicating the
202
presence of GMOs. However, this ignores that it is not farmers and producers alone who bear the costs of GMO labeling,
but also consumers.
Voluntary labeling will also allow the market to respond to
203
changing consumer demand. If consumers respond positively
to the voluntary labeling, more producers can change methods
204
in order to meet that demand, utilizing it as a “positive mar205
keting tool to consumers.” Conversely, mandatory labeling in
Europe has had the opposite effect, in that it has virtually shut
206
GM food out of the market. A voluntary labeling program
thus allows the market to change in accordance with consumer
values, rather than imposing anti-GMO values on all consum207
ers by making GMO food prohibitively expensive to produce.
Additionally, unlike the FDA’s current non-binding guide208
lines, a voluntary program could set out compulsory standards for those who choose to label to ensure transparency in the
meaning of a non-GMO label.
The FDA has previously rejected voluntary labeling with
the language “GMO free” because it considers the term mis209
leading, as most consumers equate “free” with “zero.” However, other countries with established GMO labeling have delineated a threshold level by which a certain percentage of GMOs
210
can be present in food and still be considered GMO free. The200. Cf. Byrne, supra note 145, at 69–70 (arguing that mandatory labeling
results in indifferent consumers paying more for no added benefit).
201. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 132, at 1.
202. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 193.
203. See Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1493.
204. See id. at 1493–94.
205. Strauss, supra note 150, at 193.
206. Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1474.
207. See id. at 1486–92 (contending that a mandatory labeling program
will tend to increase production costs such that sellers may be practically
forced to switch to non-GM products).
208. See Draft Guidance, supra note 59.
209. See id.
210. See Colin A. Carter et al., California’s Proposition 37: Effects of Mandatory Labeling of GM Food, AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE, July/Aug.
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se threshold levels range from 0.9% in the EU to 5% in Japan
211
and Canada. Establishing too strict of a threshold could be
dangerous to suppliers, as producers could reject more crops
212
because of GMO contamination.
The FDA believes that
methods of detection at low percentage levels are currently in213
accurate. However, some grain producers have supported Europe’s 0.9% standard as reasonable and attainable in the Unit214
ed States.
Using this standard has the added benefit of
allowing producers to meet GMO thresholds in foreign markets
215
as well.
2. Production Process Versus Finished Product Measurement
Whether a food exceeds the threshold level further depends
upon if regulations target GMOs in the finished product or in
216
the production process. The process-based definition considers genetically modified to mean any food made with GM ingredients, even if no trace remains detectable in the finished
217
product. Labeling regulations based on this definition thus
must monitor producers and rely more heavily on self-reporting
218
of compliance. Where the finished product is the concern,
219
however, tests can confirm the presence of GMOs. As Guillaume P. Gruère and S.R. Rao explain, “This difference is crucial for enforcement: a product-based system can be enforced
with testing equipment and can filter a cheater, whereas a process-based system requires viable and trustable documentation
2012, at 3, 6, available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/media/are-update/files/
articles/V15N6_2.pdf.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Grain Suppliers Express Concerns About the Non-GMO Project, THE ORGANIC & NON-GMO REPORT (Sept. 2007), http://www.non
-gmoreport.com/articles/sept07/the_non-GMO_project.php (stating that grain
suppliers contend a very low threshold would be practically unworkable due to
contamination concerns).
213. Draft Guidance, supra note 59 (“[A] threshold would require methods
to test for a wide range of genetic changes at very low levels in a wide variety
of foods. Such test methods are not available at this time.”).
214. Grain Suppliers Express Concerns About the Non-GMO Project, supra
note 212.
215. See id.
216. See Gruère & Rao, supra note 152, at 52.
217. GUILLAUME P. GRUÈRE, LABELING POLICIES OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD: LESSONS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF EXISTING APPROACHES, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RESEARCH INST. (2007), available at http://www
.cbd.int/doc/external/mop-04/ifpri-pbs-policy-07-en.pdf.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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220

systems.”
The product-based system not only provides a
quantifiable answer of GMO percentages in foods, but it does so
with little additional burden to the producer (unlike the extensive record-keeping and reporting obligations the process-based
221
system would compel). Therefore, a voluntary labeling requirement should apply to finished products as it is verifiable
and provides the assurance consumers desire.
3. Consumer Confusion
One final hurdle for a labeling program is the concern that
it will cause consumer confusion. Voluntary labeling can create
the impression in consumers that if “GMO free” is worthy of a
place on the label, then those products without the language
222
must somehow be inferior. In response to similar concerns
over irradiation labeling, the FDA stated, “[A]ny confusion created by the presence of a retail label requirement can be corrected by proper consumer education programs, and the presence of a retail label statement should not deter the
223
development of this technology.”
Requiring an additional
statement on packaging that “The United States Food and
Drug Administration has determined that there is no significant difference between food produced from genetically modified and conventional crops” could further address this con224
cern.
The FDA could reevaluate this requirement and
eventually remove it, pending consumer education programs
and a review of their effectiveness in modifying consumer
knowledge of GMO safety.
The voluntary labeling of food as “GMO free” would allow
producers and consumers who value non-GM food to market
and buy products based on this interest without saddling the
rest of the market with the cost and burden. This labeling system would work hand in hand with market initiatives such as
220. Gruère & Rao, supra note 152, at 52.
221. See, e.g., ALAN MCHUGHEN, LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED (GM)
FOODS 2 (June 22, 2008), available at http://www.agribiotech.info/details/
McHugen-Labeling%20sent%20to%20web%2002.pdf (arguing that a processbased labeling scheme would create immense practical difficulties in terms of
implementation).
222. See Byrne, supra note 145, at 49.
223. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51
Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,389 (Apr. 18, 1986).
224. Cf. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)
(Leval, J., dissenting) (indicating support for a Vermont law requiring a similarly worded label on dairy products from cows treated with growth hormones).
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those from Whole Foods or Ben & Jerry’s, but provide consumers with further assurance that a non-GMO label means
the same from brand to brand. Voluntary labels with enforceable standards thus prevent consumer deception while allowing
the market to dictate the value of GMO free food.
CONCLUSION
While the FDA has thus far refused to address GMO labeling, the Agency is the proper choice to enact regulations. Its
hesitance to do so is not based on an inability to regulate in this
arena. If it continues to waver, states may capitalize on consumer demand and fill the void, even though such regulations
likely violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and would be
preempted by any subsequent federal regulation on the matter.
The FDA should create GMO regulations that balance consumer interests with the dearth of unbiased scientific evidence
227
of negative health effects. Voluntary labeling—pursuant to
clear, reasonable, and enforceable definitions of what products
contain GMOs—allows manufacturers who wish to capitalize
on concerned consumers to do so without burdening other
manufacturers or impacting national food supplies. This approach addresses the somewhat unknown nature of GMOs
while precluding states from fear mongering and creating consumer confusion with regulations of their own. Although this
solution does not provide consumers with the full breadth of information they may desire, it allows consumer choice while respecting developing scientific understanding and constitutional
boundaries.

225. Strom, supra note 12.
226. Stewart, supra note 13.
227. See, e.g., Anyadiegwu, supra note 10, at 213–17.

